Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for inviting me. I

would like to make some very brief opening remarks, and I would

submit my written statement for the record.

What I would like to do is instead just highlight

a few points, and I would like to address more specifically the issue

of regional impact on a possible war, and how the region broadly looks at policy toward Iraq.

I think it is clear from what you heard already that there is pervasive

opposition to a military campaign toward Iraq in any foreseeable

future, and it is very important to understand what the calculations

are in the region that lead to this kind of opposition.

I would like to begin by saying that while a lot of that has to

do with an assessment of public opinion in the region and the pressures

they face from their own public, much of that calculation is

not based only on public opinion. Some of the calculation is based

on very specific strategic calculations that these leaders and these governments make.

We have to first be clear, not each one of them has the same calculation.

The calculations of Jordan, Iran, Syria, the GCC states

are different, but they have some things in common. They all worry

about the consequences of what happens after.

First, it is clear that they do not see the threat in the same way

that we do. They do not believe that Iraq today poses a serious

military threat that they have to worry about, and they see our

focus on it as out of place. They have other priorities they would

like to address in the region, and they see this as taking us and

them away from other priorities, such as the Arab-Israeli issue,

and in that regard they fear that this will disrupt very important priorities.

They also fear that after the war, first and foremost, there may

be more instability than we are planning for. They think that we

might be optimistic about our capability to bring about a desirable

outcome in Iraq that would be a stable outcome for each one of

them, especially Turkey, Syria, but even Iran and the GCC states,

and in that regard they are not confident about our own assurances

that we intend to spend the time and the money and the energy

and the military clout to be there for as long as it takes to bring a desirable outcome about.

First and foremost, I think they fear instability at the strategic

level. But consider even a happy outcome from our point of view,

which is an outcome that says we will put the necessary resources

to bring about a better government in Iraq, a stable situation in

the region, so therefore they do not have to worry about the issue

of instability. Then we can only do that by putting forth significant

forces that would turn Iraq essentially into an American base and

an American ally. In a way, that clearly disrupts the strategic calculus

for many of them in a way that is worrisome for many of

them, even aside from public opinion. Not all of them, but many of them worry about it.

But ultimately it boils down to another factor, which is public

opinion. They do worry about it. There is a pervasive resentment

of the United States today in the region. There is a sense of public

power that has not been exhibited before in the region, and much

of it is directed not so much at the United States only. It is really

a pervasive sense of frustration and humiliation with an existing

order that many people in the region do not support, but they see

the United States as an anchor of that order, and clearly the highlighting

of the pain on the Palestinian-Israeli front over the last

few months has exacerbated that resentment in a way that is putting

pressure on these governments.

I do not want to exaggerate this and say that governments are

weak and cannot be contained. Clearly, the Governments have

been able to contain pressure before, and clearly, even in the recent

crisis, they have done so in a way that diminished the impact of

public resentment and public pressure.

The real issue for them is, at what cost? Even if they succeed,

at what cost can they do it? I know that there is a school of

thought that is dominant in some of the public debate today, which

says, who cares about public opinion in the region, or who cares

even about the positions of these governments who are opposing

the United States? The assessment is that we are powerful enough

to do it on our own, and when they see that we are going to do

it anyway, they are going to jump on the American bandwagon,

and they are mostly authoritarian governments. They are going to

find a way to bring the public along, and therefore, why should we

care? Why should we pay attention to that? Let us do what we

need to do, and they are just going to jump on a winning American band wagon.

I am not going to address the military side of that. You have

heard a lot about it. But the political side of it, I think it is a mistake

to make that argument. I have no doubt that some governments

will jump on a winning American bandwagon, no question

about it. I think people do not like to be on the sides of losers, and

they do not want to be on the wrong side of the United States, especially

if they are sure that the United States is going to win, and

I think militarily there will be no doubt.

The real question is at what cost and what are the consequences,

but I think if the United States is willing to put a lot of resources

into it, that there is no doubt about the military equation of it, and

so there is no doubt that some will do it, but I will submit to you

that the calculations have changed since 1991, and clearly we cannot

be assured that all of them or even most of them, those that

joined the coalition in 1991 are going to have the jump-on-the band wagon attitude.

Let me tell you why, and I will give you a couple of reasons. One

is, the situation has changed not only in terms of the perception

of Iraqi threat. In 1991, clearly they saw Iraq as a threatening

state with military capabilities. Today, nobody really believes that

Iraq is a serious threat, and they see it mostly as a victim, so the

logic of the Iraq issue is different.

While in 1991 there may have been doubts, particularly by radicals

in the region, about the U.S. military capability and staying

power, that was made a reality after the 1991 victory. It is clear

that today no one has doubts about the United States. Most American

attitudes are really derived by a perception that America is actually

very powerful, that America is perhaps too powerful for

them, too domineering in regional politics, so the perception is not

exactly the same perception that preceded 1991, and that therefore

the logic of the psychology is very different.

From the government’s point of view, most of them probably will

do what they have to do to resist public opinion if public opinion

tries to disrupt a policy of supporting an American campaign in

Iraq, or at least sitting on the sidelines of an American campaign

toward Iraq. Many of them will probably succeed. Most of them do

not have as much certainty as they did back in 1991 that they could succeed.

The absence of certainty is in part a function of a new reality,

which is that they no longer control the flow of information. They

no longer control perception, at least in that dimension.

There is a sense that the public will get information that is going

to be disruptive to governmental agenda in a way that governments

cannot control. That is new to them. They do not know

whether it means a lot, and they do not know whether it means

a little, but they know that it presents some uncertainty about

their ability to control, and second, there is a sense of empowerment in the region.

That is, I would say, a public disgust with states in general, with

their own states, with the international system, with international

organizations, and certainly with the United States, and in that

sense to the extent that there is a public that is willing to be mobilized,

it is not mobilizing behind a possibility that Iraq might have

victory, or behind a government who is going to advocate their

causes. It is the extent to which they are going to be able to do

something on their own, or rally behind militants.

The source of inspiration today is not states, it is militants, antistate,

and the extent to which therefore they succeed is not a function

of the strength of any particular state, including Iraq, and in

that regard I think what we will have even in a successful campaign,

and even if the governments do succeed in repressing the

public, you are going to have two clear outcomes.

One is, they are only going to succeed if they are more repressive,

and I am talking about governments outside of Iraq. They will

succeed only through repression, and they have probably the capacity

to do so. They will stretch themselves to the limit, but if we

have any illusions about this then transforming the Middle East

into a democratic place I think, let us think about that a little bit more.

And second, it is undoubtedly, in my judgment, going to increase

the motivation for terrorism in the region. Maybe we can reduce

some aspects, but clearly there will be more motivation. We have

to understand that there are dynamics that will be out there regardless

of what the outcome will be actually in Iraq itself, but let

me end with a question pertaining to the nuclear threat.

I think it is interesting, we had the discussion before about

whether or not the region sees Iraq’s nuclear potential, or potential

in weapons of mass destruction as threatening to them. They are

the ones who have to fear Iraq most, its neighbors. Why aren’t they

worried about Iraq so much, and I think ultimately it is really a

different interpretation of the threat.

Most of them first do not think Iraq is close to having a nuclear

capability. They think we are exaggerating, but more importantly

I think they have a different assessment of Saddam Hussein. They

think he is a ruthless dictator, but not suicidal. They think he is

sensitive to deterrence, and they think that he goes against weaker

but not stronger opponents, and therefore, regardless of what he

does, they think he is containable. They have a different idea about

the sort of threat that he poses, and in that regard they see the

choice as being a choice between our being willing to live with him

and not being willing to live with him.

I think ultimately in our debate we have confused the two issues,

frankly. If the issue is about terrorism, then we have to remind

ourselves that this is not likely to eliminate the motivation for terrorism

in the Middle East. It may even increase it.

If our aim is to limit Iraq’s nuclear capabilities, weapons of mass

destruction capabilities, we may succeed in Iraq in particular. We

will succeed militarily, but we might have a political option if our

aim is not also to overthrow the regime, and I think what we have

done is in essence linked the regime change option with the elimination

of the weapons of mass destruction option.

That is, the political attempt to try to put controls in place that

would get Iraqi cooperation on weapons of mass destruction has always

been linked to the idea that we also want regime change, and

so the Iraqi reluctance in part, at least—at least they have not

been tested enough—has been the assumption that we are after the

regime as well as minimizing their capabilities, and therefore I

think we have not tested the political option that splits the two,

that says, let us test the choice for the regime between survival

and having nuclear weapons, let us test them politically, and I

think it is very clear that for his survival Saddam Hussein is willing

to give up almost anything.

At the same time, if his survival is at stake, there is no doubt

that he is willing to do almost anything, and I think that is very

important to remember in thinking about how we might design a

policy that would be effective toward Iraq.

Let me just put it this way. There is clearly a difference

in terms of how people in the world in Europe and the Middle

East see the priorities in Iraq. To the extent that the priority

is eliminating Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction capabilities, they

see that as being more important than the issue of regime change.

I think in our debate it is clear that we have articulated a policy

of regime change from the very beginning, even when it was not

an explicit policy, it was an implicit policy. The real question is, if,

in fact, our priority is eliminating Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction

potential above regime change, one of the avenues we certainly

have not explored is whether that tradeoff will lead us to more intrusive

international presence that would assure Iraq’s compliance.

Well, I think the question is, we really have not

tested it, because if the tradeoff, if they are truly fearful of the

military option and they see that as an alternative to the military

option, and the Iraqis see it as an alternative to the military option,

it is worth testing at a minimum. If it does not work, we will

be in a better moral position to make a different kind of argument.

It is essentially in the same spirit of what you are

saying. I think the difference is, we have to be very explicit in our

own thinking that ultimately what we then would be advocating is,

essentially we can live with the regime if it does not have weapons

of mass destruction.

That does affect the strategy, because one of the fears that we

have had in terms of the level of intrusions when we went into Iraq

and said, well, but if we remove the economic sanctions he is going

to be able to have more political power in Baghdad, or in Iraq.

Well, unfortunately that may be the case if you pursue this strategy.

That is one consequence that we have to think about.

I am not suggesting that is a strategy to pursue, but I think that

that is the implication of this kind of strategy.

I think it clearly is, Senator, a complicating factor

in some places. I mean, I think that Mr. Ajami’s point was right

about 1991, 1990 and 1991, when the King of Jordan decided essentially

that the pressure from his public was too much to bear,

that he had to stay it out, even though he was one of the friendliest

leaders toward the United States of America. He made that choice,

and obviously he made it because he felt the heat from his public.

I think that the link is not direct. I think that what is at issue

is the resentment toward the United States, which is broad-based

and is linked to a lot of issues, but it is highly focused on this issue

because of the escalation that we see, and therefore there will be

an automatic link about an American design for Iraq.

I agree with the idea that these states are robust. I think they

have proven to be robust before. They calculate on a realpolitik

basis. They have to do what they have to do to survive, and if that

means they have to go with America, they ultimately do. Even if

they do not like it, they ultimately do, but I think we should have

no illusions about the points that I tried to make earlier, one of

which is that now they have more uncertainty about their ability.

They have been stretched to the limit in the last few months because

of this pressure, and because they do not have control over

this information, that they are scared of it. It does not mean they

cannot do it, but they have more uncertainty.

But the more important point is, they can only succeed in containing

the public discontent through repression, and the net outcome

will be that we are going to end up with a Middle East that

is more repressive, and we cannot, and we should not have any illusions

about it, and I would argue—and here Mr. Ajami may have

a disagreement. He has not addressed it, but it is about the extent

to which this would be a factor in additional motivation for terrorism.

I happen to think that that is an issue. I happen to think it is

very important. Even aside from whether the public has the capacity

to overthrow regimes, I think revolutions are scarce in history,

and they clearly have been scarce in the Middle East. It is still a

state system. We often forget that.

But even authoritarian governments have to be sensitive and responsive

to their publics, and there are new channels and avenues

available to the public to express the discontent in ways that—unfortunately

through militancy, and I think it would be very easy to

conceive an argument that the militants would exploit and would

be able to do more of it than before a war with Iraq.

Senator, first of all, let me thank you for looking

after my interest too, as one of the constituents.

Well, you’ve got a problem, if you’ve got a disadvantage.

So I’m one of the constituents——

No, no, banking is not my——

Maryland is in this case.

I do worry about the consequences. I think it’s a major issue to

be concerned about. I don’t think that any of us knows how the

public is going to react. There is no question that the regime is despised;

that we have no doubt about. But we should have no illusion

that it’s going to translate into a love for America; we should

have no illusion about that. In some instances it may, and others it may not.

We should also be very careful not to miscalculate in the early

days when people do face liberation from repression and when they

do celebrate their liberation, we may translate as a welcoming mat

for us, and that could become a real problem. The Israelis made

that mistake in South Lebanon, when they thought early on that

the fact that they undermined the PLO influence in south Lebanon

translated into a welcoming mat. And, clearly, that turned out that

some of the same people who were happy to see the PLO go were

then among their fiercest enemies.

So I don’t think, first of all, we know exactly how the public is

going to react. And clearly, we could find ourselves in a situation

where we overstay our welcome.

Second, I think it is clear that everyone in the region is going

to have a stake in what happens in Iraq. And those are people who

live right next door and have resources and conflicts far better than

we do. Be it the Turks, as Mark pointed out, if we don’t coordinate

with them, they can make our lives miserable. And that is true

about the Iranians, and it is certainly true about others in the region.

And, so, it is clear that they have resources. They have the interest

and obviously the abilities. And therefore, depending on whether

we coordinate, we cooperate, whether it works with the rest of

the region in terms of coincidence of interest, it matters a lot.

And finally I want to say that I do think that no matter what

happens, even if we do have a relatively successful outcome in Iraq,

which we all pray for, and if even—and I agree, by the way, with

Fouad about Iraq’s potential. I mean, clearly Iraq has tremendous

potential. It is a country with an infrastructure, industrial history,

a secularized country, oil resources. Clearly in 1980, actually, when

it started the war with Iran, it stood on the verge of greatness in

the region. And unfortunately it has been taken on a disastrous

route that lasted for two decades and killed hundreds of thousands

of its own people. So it has suffered a lot, but it certainly has potential.

At the same time, even if the Iraqi people have a happy outcome,

I believe that most people in the region will see this as American

imperialism. Most people in the region will see it as imperialism.

And whether we can live with that is a question.

I mean, it may be true that the sentiment is we’re powerful; we

can do it; they’re going to have to do what we want regardless. I

think most will, undoubtedly, but think if you apply that same

strategy and principle to your own lives in your social relations or

domestic relations or relations with other people or business relations,

how long that can serve you, if you take that attitude as a

strategy of winning, that—where you don’t take the people’s wishes

and considerations and calculations into account, where you do

things unilaterally because you’re powerful enough to think that

they’re just going to have to see it your way and they will, and how

much resentment builds up awaiting the right moment. And unfortunately

there will be a right moment. I am not so optimistic about

the Musharraf model in Pakistan, as some people have suggested earlier.

I think I applaud Mr. Musharraf for taking the position he took.

It was tough to do, to stand out and tell people that they have a

choice. I agree with that. That was the right thing for him to do.

I am not sure he will succeed. I am less confident he will prevail.

And I am worried about what is going to happen 5 years down the

road in Pakistan in relation to us and in relation to militancy pertaining

to us. And I’m worried about Afghanistan.

And, so, looking at that, I say to myself, do I want more of that

in the region or should I follow a different route? That affects the

motivation of people, that affects the interest people, that makes

sure that my policy coincides with the interests of others not goes

against them because they have to follow my lead.

And they’re a different approach, different philosophical approach,

and I am less certain about the unilateralistic approach

that relies on a group force as a way of getting through in the Middle East.

Well, there are a lot of worst-case scenarios but

even beyond that, obviously, even in the conduct of war—I mean,

if we’re right, that if some of the panelists that you’ve heard before

were right about the fact that there is uncertainty about the degree

to which Iraq may even have nuclear weapons, and if we are right

about the ruthlessness of the leader if he knows he’s going to go

down the drain in an American attack, if he knows that this is

going to be a war against him, it’s certainly the case that he’s going

to use whatever is at his disposal, because there is not going to be

a deterrence issue anymore. He knows he’s going down, and he’s

going to use everything at his disposal.

I have no doubt that in a war, in a full war, where our aim is

to bring down the government—and, obviously, that’s going to be

the aim of the war—that he will use everything at his disposal. I

don’t know what that is, but I have no doubt. And one can paint

scenarios as to what these are. Maybe he doesn’t have much, but

the issue is if we think that there is uncertainty—there are scenarios

of this sort, there are scenarios of preemption of attacks

even prior to the American attacks if war is imminent. That could be done.

But let’s have a little word of warning, though,

Senator, which is that these are democratic countries we’re talking, about——

We’re not talking about the Middle Eastern countries.

We’re talking about countries that are differentiated,

that have their own domestic considerations, and in that regard,

if you look at public opinion so far, only in Britain is the public

about evenly divided on Iraq. There is not a single country in

which there is a majority support for entering Iraq. Most countries——